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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
While Appellee Granite Credit Union ("Appellee" or "GCU") will fully address 
each of the six issues raised by Plaintiffs/Appellants Iris M. Spafford and Earl S. Spafford 
(the "Appellants" or "Spaffords") in the Brief of Appellant ("Appellants' Brief), GCU 
believes that the following statement of issues more accurately states the issues presented 
by this appeal, and therefore submits the same in accordance with Utah R. App. P. 
24(b)(1). 
I. Whether the District Court properly entered summary judgment in favor of 
GCU in a case alleging an injury caused by dangerous and defective construction, design, 
and maintenance of a portion of property owned by GCU given the failure of the 
Spaffords to support their claims through admissible expert testimony on the issues of 
duty and causation. A district court's ruling that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law is reviewed for correctness. 
Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp. (In re General Determination of the Rights to the Use 
of All the Water), 1999 UT 39, ^ 12, 982 P.2d 65, 69. This issue was preserved in the 
District Court. (R. 428-515, 654-75.) 
II. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in striking paragraphs 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Affidavit of Earl S. Spafford, which paragraphs are 
lay opinion testimony. A dioLi^ ^ouil ^ rulings with r ^ p c ^ ,o uncover) and „*iw 
admissibility ofeviden.ee are reviewed on ai 1 abuse of discretion standard. Johnson v. 
Gold_^Uyi.n, Jwwv 111 App. /u. "H ll, -00 l'..Jd '"»D I, .'Uu 1111:•* KVJIII' ^wi;. pu^Li n! in lln. 
I> v • • " • i . * > 1 ' . - ; i U K ! ^ * 
III. \\ heiber the 1 )i-.inct Cuuri abused IU discretion in denying the Spaffords' 
motion for enlargement ol tin it lo designate expert witnesses, filed nearly four months 
affidavit of Clarence Kemp, B.C.S.E., P.L., when such report was not timely served, the 
Spaffords represented during discovery that thev h.*u1 yet to determine wh.~ the" wouV-
the scope of his untimeh RT>TI. A district court's rulings with respect to discovery ai id 
the admissibili: ". idence are reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. Johnson, 
2009 I J I App. 76 , lj 8, 206 I ' 3d at 306 I his issue was preserved in me 1;.. >i, „ * .»!il 
("i ^ • ^ "'••• 1 788 819 ) 
IV. Whether the Associate Presiding Judi?e ol me 1 bird Judicial District Court 
properly denied the Spaffords' Motioi 11 .0 Disqiam •_ ^ ^ere such motion was premised on 
evidence of bias stemming from extrajudicial sources. "I lie issue is reviewed for 
correctness. See In re ML., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct App, 1998) ("The question of 
whetl lerapart) " s affu h ivil allegh lg judicij il!: >ias is legally sufficiei it is a questlc n 1 of 
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law."). This issue was preserved in the District Court. (R. 1155-1243, 1274-1323, 1334-
37.) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
that are determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case, 
On August 2, 2007, the Spaffords filed their Complaint against GCU, in which 
they assert claims for negligence and loss of consortium premised on their contention that 
property owned by GCU suffers from defects in design and construction, which the 
Spaffords allege caused Mrs. Spafford to fall and suffer injuries on or about April 4, 
2005. GCU denies the Spaffords' allegations and has produced uncontroverted expert 
testimony establishing that its property is neither dangerous nor defective and that Mrs. 
Spafford's alleged injuries were not caused by any breach of duty on the part of GCU. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On August 2, 2007, the Spaffords commenced this personal injury action claiming 
that Mrs. Spafford suffered an injury due to design and construction defects present on 
GCU's property. GCU and the Spaffords, through their counsel, subsequently agreed to a 
scheduling order, which was amended on multiple occasions. Under the final version of 
the scheduling order, the deadline for service of the Spaffords' disclosure of expert 
witnesses was May 15, 2009. The Spaffords did not serve their expert disclosure prior to 
nn / IPAQT^ IOQf l / in^ i l w^ 1 
subsequent 1\ entered appearances pro-se. 
(in /August 3, 2009, more than two months after the deadline for service of the 
Spaffords' expei I: - iti less disc losi u e ai id expert i epoi ts tl le Spaffoi ds se t v ed tl ic it 
Disclosure of Expert Witness. GCU moved to strike this disclosure and moved for 
sui nmary judgment, arguing, in part, that the Spaffords' claims failed as a matter of law 
because they could i lot meci UK.., i .,;dcu oi cstdDn.>inh; .;^ exigence wi a defect in 
GCU's motion for summary judgment and filed a motion seeking an enlargement of time 
to designate expert witnesses OCT T moved to strike the two affidavits the Spaffords 
si lbi i litted ii I oppc sitioi i to < it: si u. i n i lai y )i idgi i lei it :»t I October 20. 2009, 
The District Court held oral argument with respect to these motions on November 24, 
2009, and on No\ ember 25. ?000. held a telephone hearing during which the District 
Coi in: t granted GCI Ps i notioi I to sti ike tl le Spaffords' expei t disclosure and affidavits, 
granted GCU's motion for summary i:i».ii.m MV .\- • ' * Sp.-iM« i '• - »•• : i to 
enlarge time. 
Oi I Decei nber I 2009, tl: le Spaf fords filed a Motioi I to Recuse or Disqualify 
seeking disqualificatioi i of 1 1 le District Coi I::I t h ldge tl n : T h n u « ,: »bk I yi o:t le S I\ k dley 
GCU filed a memorandum opposing this motion on D e ^ m b c r 1, 2009. On December 
2 I, '009, Judge Paul G. Maughn, Associate Presiding Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Coin I Khc "Asso-tiiilc IVsiiiiiir ,Ii ' d ,i [iu\\ - mini t mln deming the 
Spaffords'Motion to Recuse or Di^uii- I , ,v. Alter the Spaffords' Mo0 ? - -, .-
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Disqualify was denied, the District Court entered a Judgment and Order with respect to 
the motions considered during the hearing held on November 24, 2009. 
C Statement of Facts. 
I. Plaintiffs' Allegations. 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that on April 4, 2005, Mrs. Spafford was 
injured in a fall in the parking lot of the Granite Credit Union branch located at 6799 S. 
900 E., Midvale, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 1-3.) 
2. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege as follows: 
7. On or about April 4, 2005, Plaintiff [Mrs. Spafford] 
went to the Granite Credit Union to conduct banking 
business. 
8. At the time of the accident she was with her husband, 
Earl Spafford, who was driving. 
9. The Spaffords pulled into the south side of the credit 
union parking lot and parked in the last parking stall farthest 
to the east next to the building. 
10. Ms. Spafford got out of the passenger side of the car 
and walked forward to reach the sidewalk in front of the 
parking stall. 
II. From this particular parking stall there is not enough 
room for a passenger exiting their vehicle to step up onto the 
south facing curb. Rather the passenger must step up on the 
east facing curb which is what Ms. Spafford had to do. 
12. The curb is unmarked and is dangerous in that it is 
uneven. The curb quickly begins to slant downward towards 
the building so that when one is trying to step up onto the 
curb the left foot must step up higher than the right foot by 
several inches. To add to the unsafe condition of the area, 
there is no handrail to block the area from pedestrians or to 
assist a pedestrian with his/her balance in stepping up on the 
DMEAST #12984034 v3 5 
uneven walkway. Nor is there a warning to advise the patron 
to be careful when stepping up. 
13. In addition a drain is located a few feet southeast of the 
sidewalk area in the parking lot and the asphalt around the 
drain slants downward toward the drain to allow the water to 
flow into the drain. The problem the drain creates is that the 
area close to the curb and where pedestrians must walk slants 
back toward the drain requiring a customer to exert extra 
effort to walk up to the curb. 
14. Ms. Spafford attempted to step up onto the eastside 
curb of the sidewalk with her right foot. As she went to lift 
her left foot, she did not get her foot up completely onto the 
higher part of the curb. Ms. Spafford lost her balance and fell 
backward toward the drain hitting her head on the asphalt of 
the parking lot. 
(R. 1-3.) 
3. Appellants allege that Mrs. Spafford suffered injuries as a result of her fall. 
(R.3-4.) 
4. The Spaffords' complaint alleges the existence of "design and construction 
defects" in the parking lot at the Property and that GCU "negligently and carelessly 
permitted the parking lot to become and remain in a defective and dangerous condition." 
(R.3-4.) 
5. The Spaffords' claims are premised on their allegation that GCU breached 
its duty to maintain safe premises and to eliminate dangerous conditions and defects on 
the Property, thus causing Mrs. Spafford's alleged injuries. (R. 3-4.) 
2. GCU Did Not Breach Any Duty Owed to the Spaffords Because the 
Property Is Not in a Dangerous or Defective Condition. 
6. The Property was purchased by GCU and the Midvale Branch of Granite 
Credit Union was constructed on the Property in approximately 1984. (R. 447, 459-64.) 
DMEAST #12984034 v3 6 
7. No significant changes have been made to the Property since its 
construction. (R. 447, 459-64.) 
8. No modifications or changes have been made to the parking area or the 
sidewalk/curb area of the Property since the date of Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall. (R. 447, 
473.) 
9. On June 12, 2009, GCU timely served its Disclosure of Expert Witness, 
identifying Larry Smiltneek, M.S., P.E., as an expert retained by GCU, and attaching 
copies of Mr. Smiltneek's expert report. (R. 447, 488-507.) 
10. Mr. Smiltneek examined the Property on February 15, 2008. (R. 428-443, 
447.) 
11. Mr. Smiltneek, in his report, offered his expert opinion as an engineer and 
expert on accident investigation relating to the issues of whether GCU had breached any 
duty owed to Mrs. Spafford and whether the Property was in a dangerous and defective 
condition that could have caused Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall. (R. 488-507.) 
12. Mr. Smiltneek opined that GCU did not breach any duty owed to Mrs. 
Spafford, that the Property is not in a defective or dangerous condition, and that the 
pavement, curb, sidewalk of the Property did not cause Mrs. Spafford's alleged injuries. 
(R. 428-443, 447-48.) 
13. Mr. Smiltneek in his report, offered his opinion on technical and 
specialized matters including the following: 
(a) The sidewalk and curb where Mrs. Spafford is alleged to have fallen 
is nearly perfectly level and is in a normal and expected condition; 
DMEAST #12984034 v3 7 
(b) The location of the drain near the east curb of the Property does not 
indicate any dangerous or defective condition in the Property; 
(c) The curb at the location of Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall is not 
unusually high and is the height of an ordinary step; 
(d) The circumstances of Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall indicate that her 
fall was caused by her own physical condition and not by the condition of the 
pavement, curb, or sidewalk at the Property, and 
(e) The asphalt pavement, curb and sidewalk features encountered by 
Mrs. Spafford as she made her way to Property were not in violation of any 
building code requirements, nor were they dangerous or defective. 
(R. 428-443, 448.) 
3. Procedural History. 
14. On August 2, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action. (R. 1-6.) 
15. The Spaffords' Complaint asserts a two causes of action The first is a 
claim for negligence asserted by Mrs. Spafford and the second is a claim for loss of 
consortium asserted by Mr. Spafford. (R 1-6.) 
16. On November 28, 2007, a telephonic scheduling conference was held 
between Patricia LaTulippe, Esq., then counsel for Plaintiffs, and counsel for GCU. 
(R. 21-26.) 
17. The original Scheduling Order in this matter was prepared by counsel for 
Plaintiffs and was signed by both parties in January 2008. (R. 21-26.) 
DMEAST #12984034 v3 8 
18. Pursuant to the original Scheduling Order, Plaintiffs were to serve their 
expert witness designations and reports by August 31, 2008. (R. 21-26.) 
19. On July 30, 2008, pursuant to a stipulation and motion of the parties, the 
District Court entered an amended scheduling order (the "First Amended Scheduling 
Order"), which extended the deadlines for completion of fact and expert discovery. 
(R. 50-54.) 
20. The First Amended Scheduling Order extended the date for service of 
Plaintiffs' expert witness designations and reports to December 1, 2008. (R. 50-54.) 
21. On October 31, 2008, the parties filed a Joint Motion and Stipulation for 
Amendment of Scheduling Order, again seeking to extend only the deadlines for 
completion of fact and expert discovery. (R. 58-61.) 
22. On November 3, 2008, the District Court entered an Order Amending 
Scheduling Order ("Second Amended Scheduling Order"). (R. 62-64.) 
23. The Second Amended Scheduling Order extended the date for service of 
Plaintiffs' expert witness designations and reports to February 2, 2009. (R. 62-64.) 
24. On January 8, 2009, the parties filed a Joint Motion and Stipulation for 
Amendment of Scheduling Order, which again sought to modify the cut-off dates for 
completion of fact and expert discovery. (R. 68-71.) 
25. On January 14, 2009, the District Court entered an Order Amending 
Scheduling Order (the "Third Amended Scheduling Order"). (R. 72-74.) 
26. The Third Amended Scheduling Order extended the date for service of 
Plaintiffs' expert witness designations and reports until April 3, 2009. (R. 72-74.) 
DMEAST#12984034 v3 9 
27. On March 13, 2009, the parties filed a Joint Motion and Stipulation for 
Amendment of Scheduling Order, which, once again, sought only to modify the cut-off 
dates for completion of fact and expert discovery. (R. 174-77.) 
28. On March 18, 2009, the District Court entered an Order Amending 
Scheduling Order (the "Fourth Amended Scheduling Order"). (R. 178-80.) 
29. Pursuant to the Fourth Amended Scheduling Order, the parties agreed that 
the deadlines in this matter would be as follows: 
1. The cut-off date for completion of fact discovery to be 
extended from March 13, 2009 to April 24, 2009; 
2. The deadline for service of Plaintiffs'expert witnesses 
and reports to be extended from April 3, 2009 to May 15, 
2009; 
3. The deadline for service of Defendant's expert witness 
and reports to be extended from May 1, 2009 to June 12, 
2009; 
4. Defendant shall identify non-named parties who may 
share liability by April 24, 2009; and 
5. The deadline for filing dispositive or potentially 
dispositive motions to be extended from June 19, 2009 to 
July 31, 2009. 
(R. 178-80.) 
30. On November 17, 2008, in responding to GCU's first set of interrogatories, 
the Spaffords represented that they had not yet determined which expert witnesses they 
would call at trial. (R. 451-52, 504-512.) 
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31. On June 4, 2009, after the deadline for service of Plaintiffs' expert witness 
designations and reports, Ms. LaTulippe and the law firm of Nielsen and Senior withdrew 
as counsel for the Spaffords. (R. 242-43) 
32. On June 29, 2009, the Spaffords filed pro se appearances in this action. 
(R.452) 
33. On August 3, 2009, more than three months after the deadline for service of 
Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure and expert reports, the Spaffords served their 
Disclosure of Expert Witness ("Expert Disclosure"). (R. 304-32, 453.) 
34. By the Expert Disclosure, the Spaffords purported to designate Clarence 
Kemp, P.E., Senior Project Engineer, as an expert expected to testify with respect to the 
matters set forth in Mr. Kemp's letter to Ms. LaTulippe of December 3, 2006. (R. 304-
24.) 
35. The Expert Disclosure attaches a letter dated December 3, 2006 from 
Clarence Kemp, P.E., to Ms. LaTulippe, the Spaffords' former counsel, which is labeled 
"Attorney Privileged Communication" (the "Kemp Letter"). (R. 304-24.) 
36. The Kemp Letter makes no mention of the location of Mrs. Spafford's 
alleged fall or the date of the alleged fall, and offers no opinion on the causation of Mrs. 
Spafford's alleged fall. (R. 304-24.) 
37. On August 17, 2009, GCU filed a motion seeking to strike the Spaffords' 
Expert Disclosure on the basis that it was not timely served and fails to comply with the 
requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). (R. 391-422.) 
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38. On August 19, 2009, GCU filed its motion for summary judgment, which 
was accompanied by an Affidavit of Larry Smiltneek, M.S., P.S.E., in which Mr. 
Smiltneek testified, consistent with his expert report, that the Property was not in 
dangerous or defective condition and that Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall was caused by 
something in her own physical condition, and not by the condition of the pavement, curb 
and sidewalk at the Property." (R. 428-43, 444-515.) 
39. On October 9, 2009, the Spaffords filed their Motion for Enlargement of 
Time, by which they sought entry of an order extending the May 15, 2009 deadline for 
the Spaffords to designate their experts, nearly five months after that deadline had 
expired. (R. 625-36.) GCU opposed this Motion. (R. 756-71.) 
40. On October 13, 2009, the Spaffords filed their Memorandum in Opposition 
to GCU's motion for summary judgment. (R. 654-747.) 
41. As a part of their opposition to GCU's motion for summary judgment, the 
Spaffords submitted the Affidavit of Earl S. Spafford (the "Spafford Affidavit") and the 
Affidavit of Clarence Kemp, B.C.S.E., P.E., and Senior Project Engineer ("Kemp 
Affidavit"). (R. 701-728.) 
42. On October 20, 2009, GCU filed its Motion to Strike Expert Testimony, by 
which GCU sought entry of an order striking the Kemp Affidavit and barring Mr. Kemp 
from testifying in this matter. (R. 788-819.) 
43. On October 20, 2009 GCU filed its Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Earl S. 
Spafford, by which GCU sought entry of an order striking paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
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10, and 11 of the Spafford Affidavit as conclusory, stating legal conclusions, and 
containing matters that are an improper subject for lay opinion testimony. (R. 820-51.) 
44. On November 24, 2009 at 2:00 p.m. a hearing was held before the District 
Court, the Honorable Tyrone S. Medley. The Spaffords appeared at the hearing pro-se, 
and GCU was represented by its counsel. The District Court heard argument on the 
following motions: 
(a) Defendant's Motion to Strike Disclosure of Expert Witness, filed 
August 17,2009; 
(b) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 19, 2009; 
(c) Defendant's Motion to Strike Expert Testimony, filed October 20, 
2009; 
(d) Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Earl S. Spafford, filed 
October 20, 2009. 
(e) Defendants' Motion to Strike Untimely Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2009; and 
(f) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed August 24, 2009; 
(g) Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time, filed October 5, 2009; 
(h) Plaintiffs' [renewed] Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 2009. 
(R. 1343-1348.) 
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45. On November 25, 2009, the District Court held a telephonic hearing (the 
"Telephonic Hearing") during which it announced its ruling on the various motions 
considered during the November 24 hearing. (R. 1274-1323, 1343-1348.) 
46. The District Court granted the following motions: 
(a) Defendant's Motion to Strike Disclosure of Expert Witness, filed 
August 17, 2009; 
(b) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 19, 2009; 
(c) Defendant's Motion to Strike Expert Testimony, filed October 20, 
2009; 
(d) Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Earl S. Spafford, filed 
October 20, 2009. 
(R. 1274-1323, 1343-1348.) 
47. In addition, the District Court denied the following motions: 
(a) Defendants' Motion to Strike Untimely Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2009; and 
(b) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed August 24, 2009; 
(c) Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time, filed October 5, 2009; 
(d) Plaintiffs' [renewed] Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 2009. 
(R. 1274-1323, 1343-1348.) 
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48. On December 1, 2009, the Spaffords filed a Motion to Recuse or Disqualify 
("Motion to Disqualify"), seeking to disqualify the Honorable Tyrone S. Medley from 
presiding over the case. The Spaffords' motion was accompanied by an Affidavit of 
Prejudice executed on December 1, 2009 by Earl S. Spafford. (R. 1156-1243.) 
49. GCU filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Spaffords' Motion to 
Disqualify on December 15, 2009, arguing that the reviewing judge should deny the 
Motion to Disqualify because it was based on nothing more than adverse rulings against 
the Spaffords and unsupported allegations of bias. (R. 1274-1323.) 
50. On December 21, 2009, Judge Paul G. Maughn, Associate Presiding Judge 
of the Third Judicial District Court, entered a Ruling and Order denying the Spaffords' 
Motion to Disqualify and determining that there was an "absence of credible evidence of 
actual bias arising out of Judge Medley's rulings." (R. 1334-37.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of GCU and the 
Associate Presiding Judge's denial of the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify should be 
affirmed. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in striking the Spaffords' 
untimely Expert Disclosure or in excluding the Kemp Affidavit. The deadline for service 
of the Spaffords' expert disclosure was extended by mutual consent of the parties on four 
occasions, and finally expired on May 15, 2009, at which point the Spaffords were still 
represented by counsel. More than two months after the expiration of this deadline, on 
August 3, 2009, the Spaffords served their Expert Disclosure. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) 
requires a court to exclude expert testimony where such testimony is not timely disclosed 
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in accordance with the rules. In addition, while the Spaffords claim that by providing the 
Kemp Letter to GCU's insurer they negated any prejudice to GCU caused by the 
untimely disclosure, in so arguing they ignore their own representation in discovery that 
as of November, 2008 they had yet to determined their experts for trial. Notably, this 
statement by the Spaffords came more than one year after the Spaffords filed their 
complaint and nearly two years after the date of the Kemp Letter (which the Spaffords 
subsequently identified as their expert report). 
In addition, to the extent the District Court erred in striking the Spaffords' 
untimely Expert Disclosure, such error was harmless. The Kemp Affidavit, on which the 
Spaffords relied to oppose GCU's motion for summary judgment, asserts opinions that 
are beyond those set forth in the Kemp Letter (the Spaffords' expert report). Because of 
this, the District Court's striking of the Kemp Affidavit was warranted even if the 
Spaffords' untimely Expert Disclosure should have been allowed. 
Similarly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Spaffords' 
motion for enlargement of time. The Spaffords' motion was filed nearly five months 
after the deadline for designation of experts had passed. The Spaffords argued below that 
their time to designate experts should be enlarged based on excusable neglect. 
Specifically, the Spaffords claimed that, prior to the former counsel's withdrawal, their 
former counsel and GCU's counsel had entered into an oral "open-ended" extension of 
all deadlines. GCU's counsel denied entering into such a stipulation, and the District 
Court held that, based on the history of dealings between the parties, no such stipulation 
ever existed. In any case, such a stipulation would be unenforceable under Utah R. Civ. 
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P. 29. The District Court further held that, given the record, it could not conclude that 
the Spaffords had acted in good faith. Accordingly, the denial of this motion was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in striking portions of the Spafford 
Affidavit as conclusory, stating legal conclusions, and containing matters that were 
inappropriate for lay witness testimony. District courts have broad discretion in 
determining the admissibility of evidence, and neither conclusory statements nor legal 
conclusions are admissible. In addition, Mr. Spafford sought to testify on matters 
requiring specialized and technical knowledge, including the matters relating to the 
construction and design of the Property. Thus, his affidavit was properly stricken. 
Having correctly stricken the Spaffords' affidavits offered in opposition to GCU's 
motion for summary judgment, the District Court did not err in granting summary 
judgment in favor of GCU. Construction and design defects of the type at issue in this 
case are of the type requiring specialized and technical knowledge beyond the ordinary 
experience of a layperson. Accordingly, the District Court correctly held that the 
Spaffords could not meet their burden of proof in this case without presenting expert 
testimony on the issues of breach and causation. The Spaffords presented no admissible 
expert testimony on these issues. In addition, even if the District Court erred in holding 
that expert testimony was required for the Spaffords to meet their burden of proof, such 
error would be harmless because, as set forth above, the Spaffords' affidavits offered in 
opposition to GCU's motion for summary judgment were properly stricken. 
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The Spaffords' argument that GCU had adopted an "advocacy position" for the 
District Court in opposing their Motion to Disqualify is unfounded and improper. There 
is nothing in the record suggesting that GCU took on any such role. In addition, there is 
no Utah authority supporting the Spaffords' argument that a motion to disqualify must be 
handled on a strictly pro-se basis. Finally, the Spaffords' argument, which represents an 
attack on the integrity of GCU's counsel and the District Court, violates Utah R. App. P. 
24(k). 
Finally, the Associate Presiding Judge correctly denied the Spaffords' Motion to 
Disqualify, which was based on nothing more than adverse rulings and wholly devoid of 
any evidence of bias. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
STRIKING THE SPAFFORDS' UNTIMELY EXPERT DISCLOSURE OR 
THE KEMP AFFIDAVIT. 
"'A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its 
determination typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" 
V.K.W.v. State of Utah. 2003 UT App. 87, If 9, 67 P.3d 1037, 1038-39 (quoting State v. 
Comer, 2002 UT App 219, PI 1, 51 P.3d 55). District courts also have broad discretion to 
determine the admissibility of expert testimony. Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1326 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). District court rulings on issues relating to the admission of expert 
testimony are reversed only when they "exceed the limit[] of reasonability." State v. 
Hollen. 2002 UT 35, Tj 66, 44 P.3d 794; Walker v. Hansen. 2003 UT App. 237, ^ 20, 74 
P.3d 635, 639. This Court should affirm the District Court's rulings because striking the 
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Spaffords' untimely Expert Disclosure and the Kemp Affidavit was not an abuse of 
discretion. In addition, even if the striking of the Expert Disclosure was error, it was 
harmless error, because the opinions offered in the Kemp Affidavit respecting the issues 
of duty, breach, and causation are beyond the scope of the Expert Disclosure and 
therefore have been excluded in any event. 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Striking the 
Untimely Expert Disclosure and the Kemp Affidavit. 
The Spaffords served their Expert Disclosure on August 3, 2009, more than two 
months after the agreed-upon and court-ordered deadline of May 15, 2009. (R. 393-94.) 
The May 15 deadline was the result of the parties extending the date by which the 
Spaffords were to disclose their experts on no fewer than four occasions. (R. 392-93.) 
Despite this, the Spaffords failed to timely serve their Expert Disclosure. The Spaffords' 
Expert Disclosure and the Kemp Affidavit were therefore properly stricken. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 37(f) ("If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as 
required by Rule 26(a) ..., that party shall not be permitted to use the witness...."); 
Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 331, If 8, 170 P.3d 1138 (Rule 37 permits trial court 
to exclude the evidence or impose other sanctions when a party fails to provide rule 26(a) 
disclosures); Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, ffif 11,18, 141 P.3d 629 ("[T]he 
trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by striking [the plaintiffs expert] affidavit" 
when the plaintiff neither designated the witness as an expert nor filed an expert report). 
The fact that the Spaffords are pro se parties does not excuse their failure to 
comply with the scheduling order agreed upon between the parties and entered by the 
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District Court. See Cafferty v. Taylor, 2006 UT App. 487, If 2, 2006 WL 3518529 
(observing that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with rules). Indeed, Mr. 
Spafford himself practiced law in Utah for more than forty years before resigning his 
membership in the Utah bar in 1999. (R. 395.) See Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, ffi[ 4-
5, 67 P.3d 1000, 1002 (pro se party who is "hardly a stranger to the legal system" is not 
entitled to "special leniency on the basis of pro se status"). In any event, at the time the 
relevant deadline passed, the Spaffords were represented by counsel. (R. 242-43.) 
That the Spaffords provided a copy of the Kemp Letter to GCU's insurer prior to 
litigation does not stand in the place of a timely expert disclosure under Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a). The Spaffords did not serve the Kemp Letter on GCU, and the Kemp Letter did 
not include "the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored 
by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study 
and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years." Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(3)(B). As such, the Kemp Letter cannot, in and of itself, be considered an adequate 
expert disclosure. 
In addition, the Spaffords, in responding to discovery in this matter, specifically 
advised GCU that as of November 17, 2008, they had not yet selected any trial experts. 
(R. 452, 506.) This directly undermines any claim that the Kemp Letter, dated nearly two 
years prior to this sworn discovery response, should have been regarded by GCU as an 
expert disclosure. GCU is not obligated under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
forecast or anticipate which experts Plaintiffs intend to call at trial. Rather, it was the 
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Spaffords' obligation to timely and fully disclose their experts in accordance with the 
rules. The Spaffords failed to do so. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure and the 
expert testimony of Mr. Kemp were properly stricken. 
The Spaffords argue that GCU failed to address "the mechanics of Rule 37" in its 
moving papers on its motion to strike the untimely Expert Disclosure. (Appellants' Brief, 
46.) This is simply untrue. GCU explicitly cited to Rule 37 in its moving papers. (R. 
394-95, 793-94.) Rule 37(f) specifically provides for mandatory exclusion of 
undisclosed evidence: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as 
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior 
response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall 
not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at 
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (emphasis added). This Court has specifically observed that "Utah 
law mandates that a trial court exclude an expert witness report disclosed after expiration 
of the established deadline unless the trial court otherwise chooses to exercise its 
equitable discretion." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ^ 8, 
222 P.3d 775 (emphasis added); see also Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, 
T] 35, 215 P.3d 933, 943 ("When a party fails to make timely disclosure, the district court 
is required to impose discovery sanctions on that party unless the 'failure to disclose is 
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose.'") (quoting Rule 
37(f)). 
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Accordingly, the Spaffords' argument that the District Court imposed an unduly 
harsh sanction for their admitted violation of their discovery obligations is of no moment. 
Neither Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 
876 (Utah 1975), nor Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997), 
which the Spaffords characterize as "controlling, but somewhat competing," supports the 
proposition that the exclusion of expert testimony in this case was improper. 
(Appellants' Brief, 46-47.) Westinghouse does not address the issue of exclusion of an 
expert witness, but rather involves whether a trial court abused its discretion in granting a 
motion to dismiss as a discovery sanction. Westinghouse, 544 P.2d at 877-79. Similarly, 
Morton affirmed the dismissal of a case as a discovery sanction under Rule 37(b) for 
failure to comply with an order compelling discovery. Morton, 938 P.2d at 275. 
The exclusion of an expert report under Rule 37(f) has been upheld under 
circumstances less egregious than this case. See Lippman v. Coldwell Banker 
Residential Brokerage Co., 2010 UT App. 89, ffl| 2-4 (upholding exclusion of expert 
witness testimony where plaintiff sought an extension two days after deadline passed); 
Bodell, 2009 UT 52, ^  35-38 (upholding exclusion of expert testimony on damages 
where bases for damage calculation was not disclosed until three weeks after close of fact 
discovery). In short, the District Court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 37(f). See 
id.»If 37 ("Though the district court could have reopened fact discovery to allow for these 
theories, the court was not obligated to do so"); see also Morton, 938 P.2d at 275 
("[T]here are two parties to this action, and both are entitled to fair treatment. 
[Defendant] did not seek this litigation. Its investment of time and resources toward the 
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resolution of this case was not voluntary."). As in Lippman, the District Court 
''determined that the failure to disclose was not harmless, i.e., the extension would 
prejudice Defendants and delay trial, and did not rule that good cause was shown." 2010 
UT App. 89, fflf 3-5. Accordingly, the District Court properly excluded the expert 
testimony in this case, and the District Court's Order granting summary judgment in 
favor of GCU should be upheld. See id. (u[T]he trial court was required to exclude 
[expert testimony] by operation of rule 37.") 
B. Even if the District Court Erred in Striking the Spaffords' Untimely 
Expert Disclosure, Such Error Was Harmless. 
Even if the District Court's order striking the untimely Expert Disclosure was 
error, it was harmless. A harmless error is an error that "is sufficiently inconsequential 
that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^ 20; 20 P.3d 888, 892. In this case, even if the District 
Court had permitted the Spaffords' untimely Expert Disclosure, the Kemp Affidavit was 
properly stricken to the extent that the opinions and conclusions Mr. Kemp states in his 
affidavit are beyond the scope of those set forth in the Kemp Letter, which the Spaffords 
urge qualifies as an expert disclosure. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) states, in relevant part: 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is 
retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in 
the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly 
involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written 
report prepared and signed by the witness or party. The 
report shall contain the subject matter on which the 
expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and 
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opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a 
summary of the grounds for each opinion; the 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all 
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten 
years; the compensation to be paid for the study and 
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition 
within the preceding four years. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3(B) (emphasis added). The plain language of this rule requires the 
"subject matter" of an expert's testimony and the "substance of the facts and opinions" of 
his testimony to be timely and completely disclosed. Id. 
In this case, the Kemp Letter, which contains all of the substantive opinions 
disclosed in Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure, does not offer any testimony as to the causation 
of Mrs. Spafford's alleged injury. Indeed, the Kemp Letter is merely a safety review of 
the GCU Midvale branch.1 It makes no mention of the location of Mrs. Spafford's 
alleged fall, nor does it state any opinion as to the whether the condition of any portion of 
the Property caused Mrs. Spafford's alleged injuries. It also contains material that is 
wholly irrelevant to these proceedings, including an analysis of the slope of the 
wheelchair ramps on the Property under the Americans With Disabilities Act. Mrs. 
Spafford is not confined to a wheelchair and does not claim to have fallen on a ramp at 
the Property. Moreover, the Property was constructed well before ADA standards were 
adopted. The Spaffords make no allegation in their Complaint that Mrs. Spafford's 
The Kemp Affidavit indicates that Mr. Kemp was retained "to determine if the 
premises involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature." (R. 702.) 
2
 See, e.g., Garthright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc.. 452 F.3d 1269. 1272-
73 (11th Cir. 2006) ("The ADA imposes different requirements on the owners and 
(continued...) 
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alleged injuries were caused by any ADA violation. (R. 1-5.) Critically, the fact that 
Mrs. Spafford is alleged to have fallen somewhere on the premises is not even mentioned 
in the Kemp Letter. (R. 306-07.) As such, even if Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure is 
allowed, Mr. Kemp was not disclosed as an expert on the issues of breach of duty or 
causation of injuries. 
While Utah courts have not yet addressed this issue, federal courts interpreting 
identical requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have made it clear that 
an affidavit of an expert that exceeds the scope of the opinions disclosed in that expert's 
Rule 26(a)(3) report is inadmissible and should be stricken. "A subsequent expert 
affidavit submitted to rebut a summary judgment motion may be excluded if it differs 
from an earlier Rule 26 report." Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 596, 603 (S.D. Tex 
2001); see also Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354 (1st Cir. 2004) (portions of expert 
declaration that went beyond scope of original expert designation should be stricken). 
In this case, at minimum, paragraphs 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 17 of the Kemp 
Affidavit state conclusions and opinions beyond the scope of the Spaffords' untimely 
Expert Disclosure. (R. 306-07, 701-05.) Accordingly, even if the District Court's order 
striking the Expert Disclosure were reversed, the order striking the Kemp Affidavit 
would still have been correctly entered because the testimony relating to the issue of 
(,.. continued) 
operators of facilities that existed prior to its enactment date," and requires only that 
facilities in existence prior to the ADA "'remove architectural barriers . . . where such 
removal is readily achievable'" or make their services available to disabled persons 
through other readily achievable means.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v)). 
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causation in the Kemp Affidavit is beyond the scope of the Kemp Letter. Thus, even if 
the District Court erred in striking the Expert Disclosure, its error was harmless. 
IL THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE SPAFFORDS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
TO DESIGNATE EXPERTS. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Spaffords' Motion 
for Enlargement of Time. The Spaffords' motion, which sought an order extending the 
time in which to serve expert disclosures, was filed more than five months after the court-
ordered deadline for expert disclosures. (R. 625-33, 756-71.) Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b) states, 
in relevant part: 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by 
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at 
or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at 
any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice 
order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before 
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as 
extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after 
the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be 
done where the failure to act was the result of excusable 
neglect. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b). When deciding a motion premised on excusable neglect under Rule 
6(b), courts consider "(1) whether plaintiff acted in good faith; (2) the danger of prejudice 
to the non-moving party; (3) the reason for plaintiffs delay; and (4) the length of the 
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings." Stoddard v. Smith, 2001 UT 47, 
1f 24, 27 P.3d 546, 551 (affirming district court's denial of Rule 6(b) motion). 
The Spaffords argue that their failure to timely disclose their expert witness is 
justified by excusable neglect, claiming that their prior counsel was acting under an 
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"open ended stipulation" that was agreed upon by counsel for GCU. (Appellants' Brief, 
37-39.) As the District Court recognized, this is contradicted by the record and the 
history of this case, which included four agreed-upon stipulations extending the deadline 
for expert disclosures. (R. 1373-74 (transcript of telephonic hearing).) Counsel for GCU 
never agreed to extend any of the deadlines set forth in the Fourth Amended Scheduling 
Order, and certainly never agreed to an "open ended extension." (R. 756-71.) Nor did 
GCU's counsel, as the Spaffords suggest, "harshly den[y] and decline[] to follow" any 
such agreed-upon "open ended extension." (Appellants' Brief, 37.) The fact is that no 
such agreed-upon stipulation ever existed. (R. 756-71.) 
In any event, even if the Spaffords' self-serving claim of an orally agreed-upon 
"open ended extension" were true, such agreement would be entirely unenforceable. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 29 could not be more clear on this on this point: 
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written 
stipulation . . . (2) modify the procedures provided by these 
rules for disclosure and discovery . . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 29 (emphasis added.) The plain language of this rule requires that any 
modification of an expert disclosure deadline be made by written stipulation. Thus, even 
if the parties had discussed an oral stipulation, which they did not, a written stipulation 
would have been required. 
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Federal case law interpreting the language of Rule 29 makes it clear that absent a 
written stipulation, there can be no modifications to disclosure deadlines. See, e.g., 
Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, GMBH, 46 F.3d 1298, 1311 (3d. Cir. 1995) ("We 
observe, as did the district court, that plaintiff has failed to comport with Rule 29 of the 
[Fed. R. Civ. P.] which requires a written stipulation when modifying procedures 
governing discovery."); Lee v. Central Gulf Towing, L.L.C., No. 04-1497, 2004 WL 
2988478, *2, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257 (E.D. La. December 9, 2004) (unpublished) 
("The purpose of requiring written stipulations is to eliminate the possibility of confusion 
and disagreement between counsel as to what was agreed upon.").4 
As the District Court recognized, the Spaffords' effort to support their claim of 
excusable neglect by arguing that they acted in good faith is belied by the fact that there 
was no written stipulation reflecting the "open ended" extension they and their former 
counsel claim existed, and they have never presented a single piece of documentary 
evidence indicating the existence of such a stipulation. (R. 1375 (page 67 of transcript of 
November 25 Hearing).) The District Court, in fact, noted that based on the record, it 
could not conclude that the Spaffords had acted in good faith in filing their motion for 
enlargement of time. (Id) It is also telling that the Spaffords filed a motion seeking to 
vacate all scheduling order deadlines in this case on July 20, 2009, without making any 
While Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 was amended in 2007 to eliminate the requirement of 
a written stipulation, Utah opted to retain this requirement and has not adopted this 
change to the Federal Rules. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 with Utah R. Civ. P. 29. 
In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 30(f), a true and correct copy of this 
opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
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mention of a purported stipulation or claiming excusable neglect. (R. 248-50.) Indeed, 
making no claim of an orally agreed-upon stipulation, the Spaffords argued that as pro-se 
parties, they were entirely immune from scheduling orders under Rule 26(a). (R. 519-24, 
1377.) 
GCU, for its part, denies having entered into any oral stipulation, and the District 
Court determined below that no such stipulation existed. (R. 1378 (pages 66-69 of 
transcript of November 25, 2009 telephonic hearing.) It is precisely this type of situation 
that Utah R. Civ. P. 29 was intended to remedy. Utah R. Civ. P. 29 renders the 
Spaffords' claimed "oral stipulation" a nullity because even if it existed, it would be 
unenforceable. 
In any event, the lack of due diligence on the part of the Spaffords and their 
counsel establishes that there was no excusable neglect in this case. See Mini Spas, Inc. 
v.Indus. Common of Utah, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (defining "excusable neglect" 
as requiring the exercise of due diligence by a "reasonably prudent person under similar 
circumstances," and considering a mistake inexcusable where party failed to exercise due 
diligence). 
In addition, the District Court correctly determined that GCU would suffer 
prejudice if it granted the Spaffords' request for enlargement of time. "The purpose of 
requiring parties to disclose witnesses by a certain date is to allow the lawsuit to proceed 
in an orderly way and to avoid unnecessary trial delays." Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 
2010 UT App 171, If 15, 235 P.3d 791. Permitting the Spaffords' after-the-fact 
disclosure of their expert witness would effectively nullify the scheduling orders agreed 
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upon by the parties and entered by the District Court and it would be contrary to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. As the District Court recognized, GCU would be unfairly 
prejudiced by the time, burden, and expense of additional discovery, including the 
potential deposition of Mr. Kemp and other expert discovery.5 (R. 1372 (page 68 of 
hearing transcript).) In addition, GCU, at the time of the Spaffords' motion to enlarge 
time, had filed a motion for summary judgment based on the lack of a timely disclosure 
of expert testimony. (Id) GCU timely completed all of its discovery in this matter and 
timely made all required disclosures. 
The Spaffords' argument that GCU would not suffer prejudice because the case 
was "nowhere near trial" when they filed their motion to enlarge time is entirely 
misplaced. (Appellants' Brief, 42.) As the Spaffords' admit, fact discovery in this case 
had been closed for over 90 days at the time their motion was filed. (Id.) While no trial 
date had yet been set, with fact discovery complete, and all experts having been 
designated, the case was far closer to trial than the Spaffords' represent, assuming the 
case had not been disposed of on summary judgment. 
In addition, the Spaffords' claim that any prejudice to GCU is ameliorated by their 
having provided a copy of the Kemp Letter to GCU's insurer before litigation 
Contrary to the Spaffords' representation in their brief, GCU did not "ma[ke] 
the deliberate decision to forego" taking the deposition of Mr. Kemp. (Appellants' Brief, 
41.) GCU had no need to undertake the expense of deposing Mr. Kemp, given that he 
was never properly disclosed as an expert. GCU had no duty to build the Spaffords' case 
for them by deposing an undesignated expert or to make the assumption that Mr. Kemp 
would be their designated expert. Simply put, a party cannot be deemed to have 
"foregone" the opportunity to depose an expert where no expert has been designated. 
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commenced is incorrect. (Appellants' Brief, 40-41.) In making this argument, the 
Spaffords necessarily ignore the fact that in responding to discovery in this matter, they 
specifically advised GCU that, as of November 17, 2008, they had not yet determined 
which experts they would use at trial. GCU had no way of knowing that Plaintiffs, 
having made this representation, intended to use Mr. Kemp as a testifying expert. GCU 
is not obligated under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to forecast or anticipate which 
experts the Spaffords intend to call at trial. Rather, it was the Spaffords' obligation to 
timely and fully disclose their experts in accordance with the rules. 
Finally, the Spaffords' pro-se status does not justify their failure to comply with 
court-ordered disclosure deadlines or support their claim of excusable neglect. See 
Cafferty, 2006 UT App. 487, J^ 2 (pro se litigants must comply with rules.) There is no 
justification for the Spaffords' failure to timely disclose experts, and no excusable neglect 
that could justify the after-the-fact extension embodied in their motion to enlarge time. 
Accordingly, the District Court's denial of that motion was not an abuse of discretion. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
STRIKING PORTIONS OF THE SPAFFORD AFFIDAVIT AS 
CONCLUSORY, STATING LEGAL CONCLUSIONS, AND CONTAINING 
IMPROPER LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting GCU's motion to strike 
the Spafford Affidavit. District Courts have "broad discretion to admit or exclude 
evidence" and their rulings on evidentiary matters are rarely disturbed. V.K.W. v. State 
of Utah, 2003 UT App. 87, If 9, 67 P.3d 1037, 1038-39. The District Court struck 
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Spafford Affidavit as conclusory, stating 
legal conclusions, and containing matters that are not properly the subject of lay opinion 
testimony. (R.70-71.) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) states that affidavits supporting or opposing a summary 
judgment motion "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). It is axiomatic 
that a court must disregard any portion of an affidavit that is conclusory or contains 
"legal conclusion^] that the [affiant is] not qualified to make." Capital Assets Financial 
Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Norton v. Blackham, 669 
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (conclusory affidavits are inadmissible); see also Harris v. 
Beneficial Oklahoma, Inc., 209 B.R. 990, 997 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) ("[A]n affidavit 
containing conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts lacks probative 
value."). 
Paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11 of the Spafford Affidavit are either conclusory 
or state legal conclusions. As such, the District Court properly struck these paragraphs. 
For example, in paragraphs 3, 8, and 11 of the Spafford Affidavit, Mr. Spafford, a former 
attorney, attempts to state legal conclusions as the proper scope of lay witness testimony. 
(R. 707-11.) In addition, Mr. Spafford makes an unsupported legal conclusion in 
paragraph 10 as to the adequacy of GCU's accessible parking areas. (R. 710.) Further, 
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Spafford Affidavit characterize the Property as "badly 
maintained," "inadequately painted," and "in a state of disrepair," without reference to 
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any factual basis to support these conclusions. (R. 709.) Each of these paragraphs is 
conclusory and therefore was properly stricken. 
In addition, Utah R. Evid. 701 states that lay "witness' testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally 
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness' testimony or the determination of the fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 701. Lay 
witness testimony that purports to offer testimony on matters based on "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge" is improper and inadmissible. State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App. 226, Tf 11, 95 P.3d 1193, 1196. In paragraphs 3-11 of the 
Spafford Affidavit, Mr. Spafford attempted to offer his opinion as a lay witness with 
respect to numerous issues relating to the construction, design, and maintenance of the 
GCU's property. (R. 707-11.) These are each matters requiring specialized knowledge 
beyond the scope of lay testimony. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in striking the Spafford Affidavit. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF GCU. 
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting GCU's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Because There Were No Disputes of Material Fact 
and GCU Was Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of GCU. 
Summary judgment is appropriate '"against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish an existence of an element essential to that parties case, and on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial/" Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 
1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317 
(1986)). The "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-
moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts and material." Id. 
1. The Spaffords Bore the Burden of Establishing the Elements of 
Their Claims and Failed to Meet that Burden. 
The Spaffords asserted two causes of action against GCU in their complaint: (1) a 
negligence claim and (2) a claim for loss of consortium. (R. 1-6.) Under Utah law, a 
"spouse's action for loss of consortium ... [is] derivative from the cause of action existing 
in behalf of the injured person[?] and ... [it] may not exist in cases where the injured 
person would not have a cause of action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-1 l(5)(a), (b). 
Accordingly, because Mrs. Spafford's negligence claim fails as a matter of law, Mr. 
Spafford's claim for loss of consortium also fails. See Fox v. Brigham Young 
University,, 2007 UT App. 406,1f 24, 176 P.3d 446, 451 (upholding dismissal of loss of 
consortium claim on basis that it "ceased to exist" when plaintiffs' negligence claim 
failed). 
"The essential elements of a negligence action are: (1) a duty of reasonable care 
owed by the defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation, both 
actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff." 
Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). The Spaffords allege that GCU 
breached its duty to maintain safe premises and to eliminate dangerous conditions and 
defects on the Property, and that such alleged breach caused Mrs. Spafford's alleged 
injuries. (Complaint, ffif 16-19.) The Spaffords' negligence claim fails as a matter of law 
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because the Spaffords cannot meet their burden of establishing that GCU breached a duty 
owed to Mrs. Spafford. "Plaintiffs carry the 'burden [of] establishing] a prima facie case 
of negligence,' . . . including "proximate and actual causation of the injury." Fox, 2007 
UT App. 406,1f 21, 176 P.3d at 451 (quoting Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 
601 (Utah Ct.App. 1995)). 
In this case, the District Court correctly held that Plaintiffs bore the burden of 
establishing the elements of duty and causation through expert testimony. (R. 1372 (page 
70 of hearing transcript).) Proving a breach of a duty of care involving a construction or 
design defect requires expert testimony. "Where the average person has little 
understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions, expert testimony 
must ordinarily be presented to establish the standard of care." Wycalis v. Guardian Title 
of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). For this reason, expert testimony 
is required to establish the standard of care for engineers and architects. Preston & 
Chambers, P.C. v. Koller. 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Nauman v. Harold K. 
Beecher & Assocs., 467 P.2d 610, 615 (Utah 1970); Nat'l Housing Indus., Inc. v. E. L. 
Jones Dev. Co., 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); see also Ford Motor Co. v. 
Bartholomew, 297 S.E.2d 675, 679 (Va. 1982) (expert testimony required to demonstrate 
defect in automotive transmission design). 
In Fox, on nearly identical facts, the plaintiffs sought to recover for a fall Mrs. Fox 
suffered on a stairway on the Brigham Young University ("BYU") campus. 2007 UT 
App 406, *|J1I 2-3. The Foxes brought claims for negligence and loss of consortium, 
asserting that BYU had negligently maintained the stairs and that the defective stairs had 
i^i if- A r>T JI^ o n o jino » . ,o ^ S 
caused Mrs. Fox's fall and injuries. IcLTJ8. BYU filed a motion in limine arguing that H 
the Foxes' negligence claim failed because the Foxes did not have expert testimony to 
establish a prima facie case of negligence. Id. The trial court converted BYU's motion 
to a motion to dismiss. Id. Y[[ 9-10. In dismissing the Foxes' claims with prejudice, the 
trial court noted that "it had been presented with two plausible theories of causation— 
failure of an osteoarthritic knee or defective stairs—and, absent expert testimony, the 
court would have to use speculation to choose between the two theories." Id. fflf 9-11. 
This Court affirmed, holding that expert testimony was necessary to prove the casual link 
between BYU's alleged negligence and Mrs. Fox's claimed injury. Id. <([ 23. 
The Spaffords argue that Fox stands only for the narrow proposition that expert 
testimony is only required in cases involving "obscure medical factors." (Appellants' 
Brief, 24.) This overly narrow reading of Fox, however, is contrary to Fox and well-
established Utah law. Fox does not stand for the mere proposition that expert testimony 
is required only in cases involving "obscure medical factors." Rather, Fox recognizes 
that, under Utah law, expert testimony is required in cases where the elements of a 
negligence claim must be proven through resort to factors beyond the knowledge of the 
ordinary lay person. See Fox, 2007 UT App 406, ^ 22 (element of negligence requiring 
reference to "factors which are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge" must be 
proven through expert testimony). The factual similarity between Fox and this case 
cannot be ignored. Fox, like this case, involved a fall claimed to have been caused by 
defects in construction, design, and maintenance. Id Moreover, Utah law is clear that 
expert testimony is required in any case involving matters that are beyond the knowledge 
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of ordinary lay people. See Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825 n. 8 (expert testimony required in 
cases "[w]here the average person has little understanding of the duties owed"). 
In this case, the District Court correctly determined that the Spaffords could not 
meet their burden of establishing through expert testimony a breach of duty by GCU or 
that any alleged negligence of GCU caused Mrs. Spafford's alleged injuries. (R. 71.) 
Questions regarding whether the construction, design, and maintenance of the Property 
were dangerous and defective clearly involve matters that are beyond the experience of 
an ordinary lay juror. For example, the Spaffords rely on allegations that Mrs. Spafford's 
alleged injury was caused by structural defects in the curb of the Property and that the 
Property was in violation of various building codes. (R. 657-670.) GCU presented 
expert testimony in support of its motion, establishing that the curb claimed to be the 
cause of Mrs. Spafford's fall was neither dangerous nor defective, and that Mrs. 
Spafford's alleged injuries were caused by her own physical condition, not by the 
condition of the Property. (R. 428-23.) The Spaffords failed to counter this evidence 
through admissible expert testimony. As set forth above, the testimony of the Spaffords' 
designated expert was properly excluded. Accordingly, the District Court correctly 
entered summary judgment in favor of GCU. 
The Spaffords incorrectly argue that GCU's expert testimony, the ADA, and the 
deposition testimony of GCU's former CEO "that he personally conducted periodic 
inspections of the property" somehow satisfies their burden of establishing a breach of 
duty by GCU. (Appellants' Brief, 15-18) The Spaffords have never raised any claim that 
Mrs. Spafford was injured as a result of an ADA violation, or even any claim that 
Mrs. Spafford has a disability. (R. 1-5.) Given that, it is perplexing that the Spaffords 
are now arguing on appeal that GCU breached a duty to remove "architectural barriers" 
to the Property and that Mrs. Spafford was injured as a consequence.6 This issue was 
never raised prior to this appeal and cannot be raised now. See Jacobsen v. Thomas, 
2008 UT App. 334, % 3 (appellate court "will not review issues not preserved below"). In 
addition, this argument consists of rank speculation. The Spaffords bore the burden of 
establishing a breach of a duty owed to them through expert testimony and failed to do 
so.7 Accordingly, the District Court correctly entered summary judgment in GCU's 
favor. 
2. If the District Court Erred in Requiring Expert Testimony to 
Establish the Elements of Breach and Causation, Such Error Was 
Harmless. 
Even if the District Court erred in its application of Fox and holding that the 
Spaffords were required to present expert testimony to support their claims, such error is 
harmless and does not warrant reversal. A party opposing summary judgment '"must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Peterson v. Coca-Cola 
"Architectural barriers are physical features that limit or prevent people with 
disabilities from obtaining the goods or services that are offered" by a business. United 
States Small Business Administration, United States Department of Justice, ADA Guide 
for Small Businesses, October 9, 2008, http://www.ada.gov/smbustxt.htm; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The Spaffords, however, have never alleged that Mrs. Spafford, 
prior to her fall, was a person with a disability—indeed, they argued the contrary. 
(R. 710.) 
Contrary to the Spaffords' argument, GCU did object to pictures appended to 
the Spafford Affidavit, and in fact obtained an order striking the paragraph in which those 
pictures were identified. (Appellants5 Brief, 16, R. 708, 820-51, 1343-48.) 
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USA, 2002 UT 42, ^ 20, 48 P.3d 941 (quoting Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 
(Utah 1979)). Inadmissible affidavits cannot be used to oppose a motion for summary 
judgment. Pipkin v. Haugen, 2003 UT App. 216, ^ 2-3. In this case, the Spaffords 
attempted to oppose GCU's motion through the affidavits of Earl S. Spafford and 
Clarence Kemp. As set forth above, the District Court properly excluded Mr. Kemp's 
expert testimony and every paragraph of Mr. Spafford's affidavit related in any way to 
the Spaffords' claims. Accordingly, even if the District Court had not required the 
Spaffords to present expert testimony in support of their claims, the only evidence before 
the District Court on GCU's motion was the Smiltneek Affidavit, which plainly satisfied 
GCU's burden of establishing that there was no genuine issue of material fact precluding 
the entry of summary judgment. Thus, while GCU contends that the District Court 
properly applied Fox and correctly held that the Spaffords were required to present expert 
testimony in support of their claims, any error of the District Court on these issues was 
harmless and does not warrant reversal. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT DID 
NOT VIOLATE THE SPAFFORDS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
The Spaffords argue that the District Court's rulings on the evidentiary issues and 
GCU's motion for summary judgment in this case deprived them of their constitutional 
rights under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, the Due Process 
Clause of the Utah State Constitution, and the Open Courts Clause of the Utah State 
Constitution. (Appellants' Brief, 54-56.) These arguments are incorrect. 
- ^Q 
As an initial matter, while the Utah Open Courts Clause "provides citizens of Utah 
the right to a remedy for an injury," that right certainly does not alter a plaintiffs 
o 
obligation to meet the burden of proof set forth by law with respect to their claims. 
Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2005 UT 30, ^ 13, 116 P.3d 295, 299; Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56; see also Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1891 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (summary 
judgment is appropriate against party who fails to meet burden of proof). Indeed, the 
Open Courts Clause is intended as a limit on "the legislature's power to abrogate existing 
legal rights." Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, If 42, 57 P.3d 1007, 1019. In this 
case, the Spaffords were not deprived of the opportunity to present their claims to a court 
of this state. To the contrary, they were allowed open and fair access to an impartial 
forum, but failed to sustain their burden. 
Similarly, the Spaffords have not been deprived of their constitutional rights to 
due process under the U.S. and Utah constitutions. Due process entails the right to notice 
and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 
UT 6, f 38, 44 P.3d 663. The Spaffords were given this opportunity. All matters ruled 
upon by the District Court were fully briefed by both parties, and the Spaffords were 
permitted a full and fair opportunity to argue their positions before the District Court. 
The mere fact that the Spaffords' "day in court" did not turn out favorably does not 
establish the existence of a due process violation. 
The Utah Open Courts Clause provides in relevant part that "all courts shall be 
open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 11 (2010). 
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VI. THE SPAFFORDS' ARGUMENT THAT GCU "ADOPTED AN 
ADVOCACY ROLE ON BEHALF OF THE COURT" IN OPPOSING THE 
SPAFFORDS' MOTION TO RECUSE OR DISQAULIFY IS UNFOUNDED. 
The Spaffords argue that GCU improperly "stepped into the shoes of the [District 
Court] in an advocacy role" by filing "extensive memoranda in opposition" to the 
Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice by which they sought disqualification of Judge Medley. 
(Appellants' Brief, 26.) This argument is unfounded, legally incorrect, and improper 
under Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
A. The Spaffords' Claim that GCU Assumed an Advocacy Role for the 
District Court Lacks Any Evidential Basis. 
The Spaffords' argument that GCU adopted an advocacy role for the District 
Court and "enter[ed] almost a general appearance for the court" simply by opposing the 
Motion to Disqualify is unfounded and lacks support in the record. GCU has not acted or 
attempted to act as an advocate for the District Court, and to suggest otherwise 
mischaracterizes GCU's memoranda and the process for resolving disqualification 
motions, in which GCU was entitled to participate. 
B. GCU Had the Right to Oppose the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify, 
The Spaffords argue that motions to disqualify are required by rule to be handled 
on a strictly ex parte basis. (Appellants' Brief, 27.) The Spaffords have not, however, 
cited any authority supporting their novel contention. Indeed, the plain language of Rule 
63(b) does not state or require that motions to disqualify be handled on an ex parte basis. 
Nothing in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states or implies that an opposing party is 
not entitled to oppose a disqualification motion. 
4i 
To the contrary, Rule 63 states that that disqualification can be sought by motion. 
Rule 7(c)(1), which governs motions filed in Utah courts, states that: 
[M]otions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be 
accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days 
after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a 
party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). The Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was filed and designated by 
the Spaffords as a motion. Under the plain language of Rule 7(c)(1), GCU is permitted 
ten days in which to oppose such a motion. See In the Interest of A.M., 2009 UT App. 
118, If 19, 208 P.3d 1058 ("Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the 
nonmoving party to file a memorandum in opposition within ten days of service of the 
original motion and memorandum.") 
The Spaffords rely on the following language of Rule 63(b)(2) in a vain attempt to 
support their position that a motion to disqualify must be handled on an ex parte basis: 
The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed 
shall, without further hearing, enter an order granting the 
motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing 
judge. The judge shall take no further action in the case until 
the motion is decided. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(2). Nothing in this language, however, prohibits an opposing party 
from exercising its rights under Rule 7(c)(1) when a motion to disqualify has been filed. 
Instead, the language of this rule is directed solely to "[t]he judge against whom the 
motion and affidavit are directed." Rule 63(b)(2). GCU is a party, not a judge to whom a 
motion to disqualify has been directed. 
DMEAST#12984034 v3 42 
In addition, the Associate Presiding Judge's ruling on the Spaffords' Motion to 
Disqualify was issued a mere five days after GCU filed its memorandum in opposition to 
the Spaffords'motion. (R. 1274-1323, 1334-37.) That ruling makes no reference to 
GCU's memorandum. (R. 1334-37.) Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record that 
GCU's filing of an opposition memorandum in any way affected the outcome of the 
Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify. Indeed, the record suggests the contrary, as the ruling 
concluded as a matter of law that the Spaffords had presented no evidence of actual bias 
on the part of Judge Medley. (R. 1334-37.) Accordingly, even if GCU's filing of an 
opposition memorandum could somehow be characterized as an appealable error in the 
proceedings below, such error was harmless and cannot justify reversal. 
C. The Spaffords' Claim that GCU Improperly Entered a General 
Appearance for the District Court Violates Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
Utah R. App. P. 24(k) requires that briefs submitted to this Court be "free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." In their brief, the Spaffords 
accuse GCU of making filings for the purpose of "abus[ing] process" in a "transparent 
effort to curry favor with the trial court." (Appellants' Brief, 30.) The Spaffords further 
characterize GCU's efforts to oppose their Motion to Disqualify as "almost akin to 
Granite entering a general appearance for the trial court." (Id.) The Spaffords further 
accuse GCU of attempting to "interject prejudice or to otherwise curry unwarranted favor 
with the trial court." (R. 33.) These accusations are based on self-serving 
characterizations and speculation, and are entirely contradicted by the record, which 
shows that GCU has done nothing other than diligently protect its rights in accordance 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1264-1323.) 
Equally troubling is the Spaffords' suggestion that GCU and the District Court 
improperly conspired to violate the Spaffords' rights. (Appellants' Brief, 33-35.) Indeed, 
the Spaffords' Brief strongly suggest both that GCU attempted to curry favor by taking 
on such role and that such efforts would be successful, thereby depriving the Spaffords of 
their due process rights. (Appellants' Brief, 33-35.) The Spaffords even go so far as to 
accuse the District Court or GCU of attempting, through unknown persons, to alter the 
docket in order to prevent their exercise of appellate rights. (Appellants' Brief, 32-33.) 
These unfounded accusations amount to an attack on the integrity of GCU and the 
District Court, in direct contravention of Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
VIL THE ASSOCIATE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE SPAFFORDS' MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE TYRONE S. MEDLEY. 
The Associate Presiding Judge did not err in denying the Spaffords' Motion to 
Disqualify. u[T]he question of whether a party's affidavit alleging judicial bias is legally 
sufficient is a question of law." In re MJU 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Rule 63(b) states that a motion to disqualify "shall be supported by an affidavit stating 
facts sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 
63(b)(1)(A). "[A]n affiant alleging bias on the part of a judge bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the judge is not qualified to act on the case." In re Affidavit of Bias, 
947 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Utah 1997). u[S]uch bias may not be based solely on the fact that 
the judge has issued prior rulings adverse to the party making the allegation." In re M.L., 
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965 P.2d at 556. "[T]he mere fact that a judge decides a case against a party may not be 
considered in determining bias." In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d at 1154. Judges are 
presumed to be qualified and, in order to warrant recusal of a judge, judicial bias alleged 
in an affidavit must have some basis in fact and not be grounded on mere conjecture and 
speculation. In re MJU 965 P.2d at 556; Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997). In 
this case, the Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice was based on nothing more than rank 
speculation, legal conclusions, and adverse rulings. 
1. The Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice Was Premised on Mere 
Speculation and Legal Conclusions. 
In this case, the Spaffords filed their Motion to Disqualify immediately after the 
District Court orally ruled on GCU's summary judgment motion and certain related 
motions. (R. 1155-1232.) The plain language of the Affidavit of Prejudice itself 
demonstrates that the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was based on nothing more than 
rank speculation and unfounded legal conclusions. (R. 1156-1231.) By way of example 
only, Mr. Spafford claimed that the Spaffords' objection to the form of the Order 
Extending Dispositive Motion cutoff "should have legally and properly triggered a 
hearing, either at plaintiffs' request or on the court's own motion." (R. 1157.) In 
addition, the Spaffords' Affidavit of Prejudice makes conclusory statements respecting 
the Spaffords' alleged oral stipulation to an "open-ended" extension of all deadlines and 
the legal requirements for notices of hearing before the District Court. (R. 1158-59.) 
In addition, GCU notes that the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was based on 
nothing more than the Spaffords' own recollection of the proceedings, and did not refer 
AS 
to, let alone attach, any portion of the official record of proceedings before Judge 
Medley. (R. 1156-1240.) Indeed, the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was based on 
nothing more than the Spaffords' biased and conclusory characterization of the court 
record. See Poulsen, 946 P.2d at 743 n. 2 (party seeking disqualification had failed to 
meet its burden where it failed to provide the entire record of the transcript below). 
2. The Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify Provided No Evidence of Bias 
Stemming from an Extrajudicial Source. 
The reviewing judge's denial of the Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was not error 
because the Spaffords' allegations of prejudice do not demonstrate any bias stemming 
from a source outside of these judicial proceedings. "The extrajudicial source rule 
provides that statements and rulings by a judge during court proceedings generally cannot 
form the basis for disqualification unless those words or actions are 'extreme' and reflect 
ca deep-seated antagonism toward the party requesting recusal." Binks v. Maughan, 2009 
UT App 321 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (quoting In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998)). "[0]rdinarily, when a judge's words or actions are motivated by events 
originating within the context of judicial proceedings, they are insulated from charges of 
bias." U.S. v. Nickl 427 F.3d 1286, 1298 (10th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court of Utah 
quoted the following passage from a treatise on the subject to the same effect: 
The traditional judicial view is that if a judge can be 
disqualified for bias following comment or ruling during the 
court proceedings, there is no limit to disqualification motions 
and there would be a return to 'judge shopping.' Any judicial 
comment or ruling gives the appearance of partiality in the 
broadest sense to the adversely effected party. 
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Madsen v. Prudential Fed, Savings & Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 546 (Utah 1988); see 
also In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 2003 UT 35, U 7, 81 P-3d 758 (claimed bias or 
prejudice "must usually stem from an 'extrajudicial source,' not from occurrences in 
proceedings before the judge.") 
The Spaffords Affidavit of Prejudice did not allege any bias or prejudice 
originating from a source outside of the proceedings before Judge Medley. (R. 1156-
1231.) Accordingly, even if the Affidavit of Prejudice were accepted at face value, the 
Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify was properly denied. 
VIII. THE SPAFFORDS' BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE IT 
VIOLATES RULE 24. 
As set forth above, the Spaffords'Brief contains scandalous accusations, 
unsupported by the record, that violate Utah R. App. P. 24(k). These include the 
Spaffords' unfounded claim that GCU acted as an advocate for the District Court and that 
GCU made filings with the sole intention of "abusfing] process" in a "transparent effort 
to curry favor with the trial court." (Appellants' Brief, 30.) Needless to say, there is no 
support for these baseless accusations in the record. In addition, the Spaffords, without 
any evidence or foundation, accuse the District Court of ignoring the merits of this matter 
and instead "act[ing] out of expediency, seemingly to clear its case load." (Appellants' 
Brief, 57.) 
As this Court is aware, the Spaffords filed their initial brief in this matter on July 
12, 2010. On July 27, 2010, GCU moved to strike that brief on the grounds that it 
improperly set forth scandalous matters and lacked required citations to the appellate 
47 
record. On August 19, 2010, this Court granted GCU's motion to strike, ordering the 
Spaffords to file a brief that complied with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure within 
twenty days. (Order Entered August 19, 2010.) In addition, this Court included in its 
order a notation that if "the Spaffords file an amended brief but the brief is not in 
compliance with the rules of appellate procedure, the brief will be stricken and their 
appeal will be dismissed." (Id.) Despite this Court's admonition, the Spaffords have 
continued to disregard the requirements of Rule 24(k). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's Judgment and Order should be 
upheld. In addition, the ruling of the Associate Presiding Judge with respect to the 
Spaffords' Motion to Disqualify should be affirmed. 
DATED this 12th day of October 2010. 
-awe 
Matthe\k L. Moncur 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
Attorneys for Granite CredifUnion 
\ 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOU-
ISIANA 
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DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendant's motion to compel 
plaintiffs deposition granted and plaintiffs motion to 
compel denied 
COUNSEL: For WAYNE LEE, SR, plaintiff George 
Warren Byrne, Jr, Randy Jay Ungar, Kristi Ann Post, 
Gregory T Discon, Ungar & Byrne, New Orleans, LA 
For CENTRAL GULF TOWING, L L C , DUARD 
EYMARD TOWING, L L C , CLARENDON AMER-
ICA INSURANCE COMPANY, defendants Patrick J 
McShane, Danica Colleen Benbow, Fnlot, Partridge, 
Kohnke & Clements, LC, New Orleans, LA 
JUDGES: JOSEPH C WILKINSON, JR, UNITED 
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
OPINION BY: JOSEPH C WILKINSON, JR 
OPINION 
ORDER AND REASONS 
Plaintiff, Wayne Lee, Sr, brought this personal in-
jury action under the Jones Act and general maritime law 
against defendants Central Gulf Towing, L L C and Du-
ard Eymard Towing, L L C Two motions are currently 
pending before me (1) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, 
Record Doc No 20, which seeks the production to 
plaintiff of his post-accident statement and a surveillance 
video, both of which were apparently obtained by defen-
dant's agents, and (2) Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Deposition of Plaintiff, Record Doc No 25 Both parties 
filed timely opposition memoranda Record Doc Nos 
24 28 
At the request [*2] of counsel for defendants, oral 
argument was conducted concerning defendant's motion 
on December 8, 2004 Participating were Kristi Post, 
representing plaintiff, and Patrick McShane, representing 
defendants Because both motions concern the conduct 
of plaintiffs ongoing deposition, I considered them to-
gether and conducted oral argument as to both motions at 
the December 8th hearing 
Having considered the complaint, the record, the 
submissions of the parties, the representations of counsel 
at oral argument and the applicable law, and for the fol-
lowing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's mo-
tion to compel plaintiffs deposition is GRANTFD and 
plaintiffs motion to compel is DENIED for the following 
reasons 
I PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
It is my often-expressed opinion that Fifth Circuit 
case law and the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure clearly and unambiguously require the production 
of a party's statement and surveillance materials before 
that party's deposition, when those materials have been 
requested m discovery and in the absence of a showing 
of good cause to withhold them Concerning a party's 
[*3] statements, see "Vinet v F & L Marine Mgmt " 
2004 U S Dist LEXIS 26356, C A No 04-594 "L"(2) 
Record Doc No 17 (ED La April 29, 2004)(citing, 
among other things, Fed R Civ P 26(b)(3), Miles v 
M/V Mississippi Queen 753 F 2d 1349, 1350-53, (5th 
Cir 1985) (Judge Rubin explaining in Miles that the 
Rule 26(b)(3) requirement that a party's statement be 
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produced upon request is "mandatory, not discretionary," 
that this "court's refusal to order production of the [plain-
tiffs] statements was erroneous," and that "[a] rule in-
tended to prevent trial by ambush and to further adequate 
pretrial preparation has been violated A district 
court's failure to abide by the literal dictate of the rule is 
clearly error and we so hold ")) Concerning surveillance 
film, see "Karr v Four Seasons Mar, Ltd," 2004 U S 
Dist LEXIS 6388, C A No 02-3413 T'(2), Record 
Doc No 74, 2004 WL 797728 (ED La April 12, 
2004)(citmg, among other things, Chiasson v Zapata 
Gulf Marine Corp, 988 F 2d 513, 517 (5th Cir 1993)) 
To my knowledge, there is currently no "general practice 
in this district" permitting the withholding of these mate-
rials in response to discovery requests until [*4] after 
the party's deposition, but even if there were, it would be 
contrary to the binding authorities cited above 
Thus, except for one peculiar but overriding and im-
portant circumstance in this case, I would require the 
production of both the statement of plaintiff and the sur-
veillance materials, the latter of which I have reviewed in 
camera, for the reasons discussed in my previous opin-
ions cited above That compelling, significant circum-
stance is that counsel jointly agreed to a different proce-
dure concerning these depositions 
As both counsel made clear at oral argument, an 
agreement was made between defense and plaintiffs 
counsel that both the statement and the surveillance film 
would be withheld from production until after comple-
tion of plaintiffs deposition Ordinarily, such an agree-
ment must be by written stipulation, Fed R Civ P 29, 
which provides in pertinent part "Unless otherwise di-
rected by the court, the parties may by written stipulation 
(1) provide that depositions may be taken at any time 
or place and in any manner , and (2) modify other 
procedures governing discovery " The self-evident 
purpose of this rule is to encourage agreed-upon, [*5] 
lawyer-managed discovery and to eliminate the cost, 
effort and expense involved in court intervention in dis-
covery through motion practice No such written stipula-
tion was executed in this case The purpose of requiring 
written stipulations is to eliminate the possibility of con-
fusion and disagreement between counsel as to what was 
agreed upon In this case, however, there is no confusion 
or disagreement At oral argument, plaintiffs counsel 
conceded, as defense counsel had argued in his motion 
papers, that an agreement was in fact reached between 
counsel that plaintiffs deposition would be taken before 
production of the statement and the surveillance materi-
als 
The orderly and efficient conduct of discovery de-
pends to a large extent on the cooperation of counsel, 
who must be able to rely upon the agreements they make 
An agreement was reached in this case, and there is no 
confusion or uncertainty about it Even though the 
agreement was not one required by the applicable rules 
and case law, it was an agreement nonetheless of the type 
permitted and even encouraged by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and I will enforce it in this instance 
Thus, plaintiffs motion is denied 
[*6] II DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL 
DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF 
In this motion, defendants seek to compel plaintiff to 
answer deposition questions concerning photographs of 
certain steps aboard a sister vessel to the vessel on which 
plaintiffs alleged injuries occurred Defendants represent 
that the steps aboard the vessel where the alleged acci-
dent happened were removed and neither the steps nor 
photographs of them are available Plaintiffs counsel 
instructed plaintiff not to answer these questions during 
the deposition In his opposition memorandum, plaintiff 
argues that questions about the steps aboard a sister ves-
sel as opposed to the vessel on which he was injured, are 
irrelevant 
The instruction not to answer these questions during 
the deposition was not well-founded Fed R Civ P 
30(d)(1) permits counsel to instruct a witness not to an-
swer on only three grounds, none of which were present 
in this instance Moreover, plaintiffs relevance objection 
is overruled Discovery is not trial Permitting use of 
these photographs in a discovery deposition does not 
mean that either they or the deposition testimony will be 
admissible at trial Because neither the steps nor [*7] 
any photographs of the steps from the subject vessel are 
available, photographs from its sister vessel are an ac-
ceptable alternative option for use during deposition 
questioning, in the nature of use of a demonstrative aid, 
for inquiring into how the alleged accident occurred and 
in that sense their use at a deposition is reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
Fed R Civ P 26(b)(1) Plaintiff is, of course, free dur-
ing his deposition testimony to point out any differences 
or similarities between the pictured steps and those in-
volved in his accident, and the record must be made clear 
during questioning that the pictured steps are not the 
steps where the accident occurred 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff must answer 
these questions when his deposition resumes 
III REQUESTS FOR AWARDS OF FEES AND EX-
PENSES 
Both sides have requested awards of attorney's fees 
and expenses incurred in connection with these motions 
Both requests are denied Although defendants are the 
winners as to both motions, the law supports plaintiffs 
arguments in support of his motion to compel, and only 
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the agreement between counsel compels the result 
reached. [*8] Plaintiffs opposition to defendant's mo-
tion is a good faith argument concerning the facts and the 
law. Under these circumstances, no award of fees and 
costs will be made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A). 
* * * 
Counsel are directed to schedule the continuation of 
plaintiffs deposition at a mutually convenient time and 
date at the office of plaintiffs counsel, following which 
defendants must produce both the statement and the sur-
veillance materials to plaintiff. 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of December, 
2004. 
JOSEPH C, WILKINSON, JR. 
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
